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solution for the alleviation of poverty. The goal of my research was to observe the role commercial banks
play in microfinance and the challenges that these institutions encounter, having to operate in developing
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(Peru). In addition, the study also presents recent findings in the literature on microfinance regarding the
effect of different lending types, interest rates and the delicate trade-off between profitability and
outreach.
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1.1 Background: the commercialization of microfinance
Poverty is one of the few challenges that every single country in the world has to deal with
and the numbers say it all. According to the World Bank, 2.7 billion people lived on less than
$2 a day in 2001. Despite the difficulties involved in changing this situation, there are
solutions and microfinance is one of them. Starting with the Grameen Bank founded by
Mohammad Yunus in the 1970s, microfinance represented a method of lending that was to
be tailored specifically to the world’s poorest populations. Throughout the years,
microfinance has proved to be a viable solution for the alleviation of poverty. In fact,
nowadays, the industry is facing a new phase in its history: commercialization.

Microfinance was initially a form of voluntary help to the most deprived populations.
However today, it also represents a market solution to the mitigation of poverty. The success
rates and achievements of microfinance fueled the interest of various institutions, NGOs,
banking groups and governments throughout the years and continue to do so. However, in
order to accommodate this interest, microfinance needs to become a structured, transparent
and regulated industry where everyone can find a role for themselves. Individuals who have
been working in microfinance for a long time express their discontent about the
commercialization aspect, of the notion of profit entering the field. Nevertheless, the increase
in the participation to microfinance, whether it is on behalf of a non-profit organization or a
bank, is the only factor that can make a significant change in the alleviation of poverty.

At the present stage, individuals involved in microfinance agree that the demands of the
clients of MFIs correspond to services offered by the formal financial sector. In the words of
Malcolm Harper and Sukhwinder Singh Arora, this would mean that “Microfinance
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institutions are redundant”1. What the poor have always needed is the extension of the formal
financial sector for their use, what is now being called the commercialization of
microfinance. According to Jean-Philippe de Schrevel, founder and Chief Operating Officer
of BlueOrchard Finance, “Commercialization is not a goal in itself but a means of ensuring
that financial intermediation products or services delivery are efficient”2. Indeed, Schrevel
suggests that microfinance can be a profitable business with interest rates at market level and
a repayment rate of 97% (larger than most commercial banks)3. Consequently, I shall argue
that commercial banks are the most qualified to provide an extension of financial services to
these new clients.

1.2 Outline and scope of the study
I will first present the reasons why commercial banks are best able to serve the goal of
microfinance. In a subsequent chapter II, I will outline the many ways in which a commercial
bank can partake in microfinance, an involvement ranging from a direct participation to an
indirect provision of funds. In chapter III, I will examine the barriers to the further
development of microfinance, especially institutional challenges but also macroeconomic
ones. Later, in chapter IV, I will present a study of profitability and outreach, performed as a
World Bank Policy Research Paper. This study seeks answers to the main economic and
moral questions that concern the commercialization of microfinance.

In chapter V, I will present my own work concerning the performance of a sample of
commercial banks specialized in microfinance. I have first taken a random sample of banks
from the database BankScope and I have looked at the “Operating Income”, the “Net
Harper, Malcom and Arora, Sukhwinder Singh, page 1
De Schrevel, Jean-Philippe, page 8
3
De Schrevel, Jean-Philippe, page 8, (BlueOrchard Finance s.a. is a microfinance investment consultancy)
1
2
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Income”, the “Net Interest Revenue”, the “Total Assets”, the “Equity” and, the “Deposits &
Short Term Funding” in the last accounting year for 22 banks from around the world.
Another set of data I compiled is comprised of a ratio analysis of the sample. The ratios
include “Equity / Total Assets”, “Net Interest Margin”, “Return on Average Equity
(ROAE)”, “Return on Average Assets (ROAA)”, “Cost to Income” and finally “Liquid
Assets / Customer and Short Term Funding”.

The greatest challenge in compiling this information has been to find recent figures about the
activities of these banks. Nevertheless, in forming this sample, I was able to use the list of
commercial banks specialized in microfinance on “The Mix Market” website. I then searched
for the statistics on these banks in the database BankScope: only 22 banks had up to date
financial reports and they are the ones to form my sample. In order to examine these banks
more closely, I chose to look at the case of four prominent banks in microfinance: the
Grameen Bank (Bangladesh), Bank of Khyber (Pakistan), Banco Solidario (Ecuador) and
Mibanco (Peru). For these four commercial banks, I made a diachronic comparison of their
financial performance (general data and ratios) for each of them for the past four or five
years. Furthermore, I also made a synchronic comparison of their last accounting year’s
performance with that of the average of the sample.

In chapter VI, I will present the conclusions I have reached with regards to the role of
commercial banks in microfinance and also suggest the most probable direction the industry
will take in the future. Before I do so, I would like to start the survey with a historical
outlook on the microfinance and why states have failed to provide this service.

6

1.3 The failure of state-owned banks to implement microfinance
One strategy that developing countries resorted to for economic growth was agricultural state
banks that offered a lower interest rate than the market rates, often very high due to
significant inflation. Nevertheless, state owned banks did not succeed in implementing a
sustainable microfinance program in developing countries for several reasons. First of all,
state-owned banks have eliminated the informal landing resources out of the market. This
included friends, relatives, small business that would create a network of financial support.
Nevertheless, the most crucial problem arose from the excess demand for loans: individuals,
without weighing their financial prospect, resorted to these loans and many of them soon
became non-performing loans. Indeed, the capital often became a tool of populist politics by
being employed as a means of targeting certain social strata to obtain votes in the upcoming
elections.

Also, state-owned banks have destroyed the natural selection mechanism that market interest
rates create: if the interest rates had remained at the market level, only the individuals with a
strong commitment to their project would have applied for a loan. As a result, the truly needy
citizens and the ones with the most reliable profile did not receive any financial aid. This
political pressure led to another serious problem which was the forgiving of unpaid loans by
these state-owned banks which were continually subsidized by the government: banks did not
have an incentive to collect outstanding loans. Consequently, the state-owned banks have
eroded the possible financial discipline that could have been instituted in the rural areas.

1.4 The need for commercial banks

7

By definition, commercial banks are banks “that offer a broad range of deposit accounts,
including checking, savings, and time deposits, and extend loans to individuals and
businesses”4 and they are well suited to play a role in microfinance for the following reasons.
First of all, they are regulated and supervised. Indeed, the sources of capital that are obtained
reside in an entity independent from the MFI. This is a very important factor that guarantees
the flow of funds to microfinance as it installs trust in donors. Indeed, one of the problems
encountered by microfinance institutions is the lack of a systematic control of these
organizations. There are very few credit-rating agencies supervising these institutions
leading, to difficulties in the procurement of capital. (This problem will be discussed further
in part III, which deals with the barriers to microfinance).

A second reason why commercial banks are more suited to provide microfinance concerns
the nature of their ownership. In this respect, under a private status, the owner would want to
make profit and therefore systematically seek success in their projects. The financial
institutions would therefore be strongly committed to the achievement of certain goals, such
as financial viability. This point can be considered problematic for some advocators of
microfinance from an ethical point of view.

I believe that if changes are to be made for a better financial prospect for everyone, then there
needs to be a sense of viability instituted in society: microfinance should be an ordinary
service that everyone has a right to access. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that there is no
room for both non-profit voluntary help and commercial banks in microfinance to coexist.
Poverty is at such levels today that many individuals around the world struggle to find water
and food every day of their life: such sufferings can only be mitigated through voluntary help
4

www.countrystudies.us
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that is most urgently needed. In this respect, microfinance represents a subsequent level of
help, a stage of integration for the deprived populations, a phase of adaptation to the norms of
society with respect to basic needs and a means of becoming self-sufficient.

Thirdly, banks can offer a wider range of financial services to the poor, a trend that can
already be observed in the goal of MFIs today. Another reason concerns the volume of
capital they are able to attain. Commercial banks have a wide network for getting funds and
can consequently increase the loan numbers offered or the size. Furthermore, through their
branches, they can facilitate the access to their services through more efficient transactions
and thus allow a better supervision of loans and projects.

From the perspective of the bank, microfinance appears as an advantage primarily as a means
to diversify their capital. However, the most important reward for the bank is the creation of
mainstream bank customers in a few generations: banks can increase profits by catering to a
larger number of clients around the world. One such example is the case of BRI (Bank
Rakyat Indonesia), a commercial bank offering microfinance services. BRI has experienced a
significant growth due to its large savings mobilization from its microfinance clients and was
able to use this source to subsidize its commercial loans division during the economic crisis
in Indonesia in 1998.5 Finally, another advantage for a bank involved in microfinance is the
reinforcement of its public image: engaging in the alleviation of poverty will build more trust
for the bank in the formal financial sector.

5

Campion, Anita, page 61
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II. The role of banks in microfinance
Commercial banks can engage in microfinance in many different ways, ranging from direct
relations with borrowers to a more indirect participation through the raising of capital.

2.1 Direct lending
Firstly, banks can directly lend to micro entrepreneurs. Usually, a participation of this sort is
observed in banks founded with the aim of solely serving the microfinance sector. The
pioneer in this field is the Grameen Bank founded by Muhammad Yunus in 1976, with the
sole goal of helping the impoverished through the provision of small loans to a group of
borrowers. Group lending consists of the attribution of a loan to each person in the group, but
the loans are not renewed to anyone in the group if ever one borrower defaults on the loan.
Consequently, through social pressure, the group lending method gives individuals incentives
to be financially disciplined and to repay their loans. Another example is the ProCredit group
which provides loans to small and medium-sized enterprises through its 19 development
oriented banks in Africa, Europe and Latin-American.

2.2 A microfinance subsidiary
Secondly, banks may choose to separate their microfinance operations through the creation
of a new subsidiary. Primarily, such subdivisions can help banks mitigate the levels of risks
associated with lending to the poor. Nevertheless, it can also be seen as a necessary step for
banks providing both consumer finance and microfinance, as each sector requires a different
approach to business and a distinct training of the employees. Furthermore, from the
perspective of the borrower, separating the microfinance services from the consumer finances
might generate more trust and acknowledgement of the bank’s commitment to the goal of
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reducing poverty. In this respect, Sogesol is the microfinance subsidiary of the commercial
bank Sogebank, the largest commercial bank in Haiti. The many years of experience of
Sogebank, bring some important advantages to Sogesol. The loans that originate from the
microfinance subsidiary can be repaid through the branches of Sogebank. Furthermore, the
parent company also provides other types of support to Sogesol such as human resources,
legal affairs, auditing and marketing.

2.3 Partnership with a microfinance institution
Thirdly, banks can build partnerships with microfinance institutions. Banks can lend to
microfinance institutions in the form of wholesale banking, and in turn, MFIs can employ the
capital to lend to the poor. In the partnership, the bank usually provides the loan funds, the
technology and evaluates the pricing and the levels of risk involved with the loans. On the
other hand, the MFIs undertake the origination, monitoring and collection of the loan.
Indeed, there are a lot of advantages for MFIs in engaging in partnerships with banks. With
the greater amount of capital comes the increase in loan sizes, and the more branches a bank
has, the greater the outreach achieved through geographical expansion.

Furthermore, the bank’s personnel can also provide mentoring to MFIs in terms of improving
the operational efficiencies of the organization and making it aware of standardized
international practices in the world of finances if the bank has reached such a standard. One
such example is the case of ICICI Bank in India which currently has partnerships with 72
MFIs throughout the country and aims to increase the number of its alliances to 200 by 2010.
This kind of partnership can be the most beneficial and efficient for both the bank and the
MFI.
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2.4 A microfinance fund: securitization
Fourthly, commercial banks can raise funds in domestic or international capital markets for
the lending operations of microfinance institutions. These funds can be raised in the form of
bonds in domestic markets such as the Mibanco bond of $6 million issued in December 2002.
Mibanco (Banco de la Microempresa S.A), a private bank established in 1992 in Peru, is
seeking to diversify its funding sources through such bonds. Lucy Conger, in her article “To
Market, To Market” suggests that these bonds are being bought by high net worth individuals
or institutional investors, which suggests that microfinance is slowly becoming an integral
part of the formal financial system. One role, large banking groups can play in microfinance
was exemplified by Citigroup which placed and sold the Mibanco bond through a “Dutch
auction”. Currently large commercial banks such as Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and Rabo
bank have microfinance funds that provide capital to MFIs.

Deutsche Bank is involved in microfinance through the Deutsche Bank Microfinance
Development Fund (DB MDF). The bank’s strategy is “to encourage and establish
relationships between local commercial financial institutions and MFIs by providing highrisk catalytic funds as collateral for leveraged loans from local financial institutions.”6 The
fund makes loans with “very low-cost financing (1 percent to 3 percent a year) with
maturities of one to five year”7 to the MFI which earns market interest rates on this deposit in
US dollars. The institution obtains the equivalent sum in the local currency which can then be
lent out to micro-entrepreneurs. Indeed, the loans “may not be used as working capital or as

6
7

Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 2
Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 2
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funds for direct lending”8. Consequently, the capital provided by Deutsche bank becomes a
form of collateral for the MFI, a form of securitization.

“A Typical DB MDF Loan Structure”9

III. Barriers to microfinance

3.1 The cultural dimension
Although microfinance appears as a viable solution to alleviate poverty around the world,
certain issues generate strong barriers to the development of the industry. On the least
8
9

Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 2
Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 3
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technical side, providers of microfinance need to overcome the skepticism of the poor,
trapped in poverty cycles for generations: microfinance needs to be explained thoroughly to
these new clients and advertised to microbusinesses. Furthermore, international institutions
involved in microfinance need to express a careful understanding of the local cultures in
order to gain the trust of the poor population, often isolated from the rest of the world.

3.2 Macroeconomic and bureaucratic impediments
From the perspective of the supplier of funds, the uncertainty in the economics and politics
of the developing world, where local conditions change rapidly, comprise a major risk factor.
For this reason, investors will be reluctant to provide capital and MFIs will have difficulties
in financing their loans. Another problem arises from the ceilings on interest rates imposed
by governments: microfinance institutions find themselves in a tension between the
willingness to achieve financial self-sufficiency through higher interest rates in order to
provide better services and the limits imposed on their capacity to develop through the low
interest rates. Nevertheless, studies show that when interest rates go above a certain
threshold, it lowers the incentive to borrow money. (Please refer to part IV for more
information). Another barrier to microfinance is formed by judiciary problems where the
lender of capital has to face the difficulty of enforcing contracts under a week legal system,
which is often the case in developing countries.

For commercial institutions, the most important issue comes from the lack of information on
the poor: banks cannot rely on formal records of the citizen such as a credit history and will
therefore face more risks. Furthermore, it is very hard for banks to verify if an honest effort
has been invested in the project that is undertaken with the loan. As a matter of fact, these
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problems show that in order to assess the credibility of clients, commercial banks need the
experience of MFIs which sometimes have to resort to different methods of evaluation such
as social relations and human psychology.

3.3 The lack of credit rating agencies
Credit rating in the field of microfinance is a deficiency the industry as a whole suffers from.
It is essential for MFIs to work with big auditing and rating firms in order to secure better
funding, to establish the trust of the capital suppliers and to be able to access other market
mechanisms. Getting a rating can be costly for smaller MFIs. Nevertheless, funds for ratings
can be obtained through for example the grants offered by the World Bank led consortium.10
Five rating agencies that were approved by this consortium are Microrate, Pacific Credit
Rating, Apoyo y Asociados, Equilibrium and Standard & Poor’s. Generally, MFIs first seek
to be rated by a domestic rating agency and then get a second evaluation by an international
organization such as Standard & Poor’s.

3.4 Challenges for commercial banks
There are also drawbacks to having commercial banks in microfinance. The first point that
comes to mind is their degree of commitment to the cause involved behind this financial
service. Commercial banks also need to address their microfinance customers with a different
approach than the formal market financial methodology. In this respect, for issues such as
their assessment of the client’s risk level and communications methods, the bank is mostly
going to rely on the approach of the employee, for whom the understanding of the local
culture and traditions is going to be crucial. Consequently, providing microfinance as

10

Conger, Lucy, page 25
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commercial banks requires the institutions to educate its staff towards the specificities of the
client.

According to Anita Campion11, the main challenges that the commercialization of
microfinance has to face include the donor subsidies, poor regulation and supervision, and
limited management capacity of microfinance institutions.

Campion suggests that one of the greatest impediments to the commercialization phase
appears as the subsidies that are continually directed towards the industry by the donors.
Indeed, such grants are needed at the beginning of the process, at the start of a new
microfinance institution in order to provide for the initial capital. Furthermore, such donor
subsidies can also be used in research projects by the MFIs. Nevertheless, these grants do not
allow the institution to reach a self-sufficient and efficient level if they are continually
provided: they disrupt the expected financial interaction within the industry’s market
mechanisms. Consequently, the role of the donors is unclear with regards to the mature
period of a microfinance institution.

Secondly, poor regulation and supervision of MFIs is an important problem as most of the
countries needing such forms of support are unable to oversee and control the formal
financial system. The core of the problem is the lack of understanding on behalf of the
supervisors, of the differences between the traditional financial system and microfinance. In
the microfinance industry, this includes a lower capital requirement, a waiver of usury rates,

Anita Campion is a Senior Manager at Chemonics International, a global consulting firm promoting
economic growth and higher living standards in developing countries.
11
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a different risk weighing of assets for unsecured loans, higher operational costs, and
requirement for a customized reporting (different types of documentation).

Thirdly, MFIs have a limited management capacity and their background explains why. Most
of them were NGOs with a goal to reduce poverty through the provision of capital, the initial
stage of the microfinance industry. Over time, some of them became financial institutions as
the needs of the clients evolved. However, these MFIs do not have the capacity and the
experience to be part of the commercial financial system and therefore need management
capacities in many different areas such as risk management, management of information and
internal control, marketing and customer responsiveness and human resources development
in order to minimize the transaction costs involved with each individual. Furthermore, these
MFIs also have to face institutional inefficiencies in order to achieve financial selfsufficiency and attract more commercial capital. This may include the exploration of new
technologies and a better system of accounting for expenses.

Furthermore, microfinance in rural areas has had more difficulties than in urban areas
according to Campion. In this respect, rural banks must engage in microfinance by
understanding the local agricultural facts such as the crop cycle, the revenues and
expenditures affected by the seasonal fluctuations etc. If these factors are carefully observed,
studies have shown that rural banks can also be financially self-sufficient and even profitmaking. Indeed, the rural finance market is becoming an attractive new venture for banks in
the face of profitable lending and stable savings.
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Another point to notice is the need for MFIs to provide for savings to their clients.
Nevertheless, most MFIs being NGOs, it is hard for them to offer this service as they are not
regulated financial institutions most of the time. In this respect, commercial and microfinance
oriented banks can play an important role. Indeed, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) has
experienced a significant growth due to its large savings mobilization and has also used this
microfinance source to stabilize its commercial loans division during the economic crisis in
Indonesia.

Consequently, the commercialization of microfinance has to face several obstacles. The most
important of all of them is the role that donor subsidies are going to play in the process. In
this respect, they should limit their financial involvement in providing capital to the initial
stages of the microfinance institution. In the later stages, they can help formalize the industry
by funding for technology, technical training, regulations (credit bureaus) and information
support systems. They should move away from direct subsidies and be involved in the
enforcement of the industry.

IV. A study of profitability and outreach

A World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, “Financial Performance and Outreach: A
Global Analysis of Leading Microbanks” by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, investigates
the reason why high repayment rates observed in microfinance are not always translated into
profitability and thus self-sufficiency for institutions. The reason behind this phenomenon is
the effect of different lending methods according to the authors who have looked at statistics
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for 124 MFIs (the data was obtained from www.mixmarket.org). Although over half of these
institutions were profitable, 20% of the sample was still subsidized. Individual, solidarity
group and village type lending methods were the ones considered in this research.

Table 1: Subsidized Share of Funding 12

4.1 Lending types: individual, group and village
Individual-based lending “draws on traditional banking practices and involves a standard
bilateral relationship between the bank and customer”13. It is mostly predominant in East
Asia and the Pacific. This method appears as the most vulnerable one to weak enforcement
policies and information asymmetries. Only for this type of lending the authors observe a
positive return on assets. Furthermore, less than half of the customers are women. The
authors have found that as the interest rate rises above the threshold of 60%, it generates
lower profits in this category. Furthermore, increasing the investments on the workforce
12
13

Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 36
Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 5
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increase the profits as the lender cannot rely on the client for information. In general,
individual-based lending is practiced for larger loans ($1220 on average) and therefore with
less severe poverty levels. Furthermore, this method has proven to help MFIs become
financially self-sufficient. The authors found that labor costs are associated with higher
profitability with this method of lending as borrowers would receive larger loans once they
are identified as reliable customers.

Group lending, initially employed by the Grameen Bank, is comprised of the voluntary
gathering of several individuals who then “assume a joint liability for the repayment of the
loans given to the group members.”14 Group lending is practiced for individuals under more
sever poverty situations (average loan size $431) as opposed to individual-based lending and
therefore costs are relatively higher than for individual-based lending. Furthermore the
majority of the customers for group lending are formed by women. Some form of group
lending is the most frequently observed lending method in South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa.

The third lending method, village banking, is a form of group lending where “each branch
forms a single, large group and is given a degree of self-governance15”. They make the
smallest loans in size ($149 on average); they charge the highest interest rates and face the
highest average costs according to the survey. Village banks are the least profitable lending
type as they serve the poorest and their customers are largely women. Village banks are the
lending method to be comprised of the highest share of subsidies in their capital (over 30%).

14

Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 4
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Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 10
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Indeed, the authors observe that the higher the share of subsidies for a MFI, the lower the
profitability.

Table 2: Summary Statistics by Lending Type16

Table 3: MFI Lending Style by Region17

4.2 Relation between rising interest rates, and repayment rates and profitability
The first question the paper investigates is the relation between rising interest rates and,
repayment rates and profitability. With respect to individual lenders, they are more profit
16
17

Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 35
Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 34
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generating with higher interest rates. Nevertheless, this profitability only exists up to a
certain level of interest rate where beyond, the demand for loans decreases. In this sample,
the individual-based lenders with the highest interest rates enjoy better repayment
performances than for lower interest rates. Contrary to this, increasing interest rates result in
poorer performances for solidarity groups.

Another observation was the effect of higher labor costs, as a fraction of total assets, on the
lending methods. In this respect, individual-based lenders have experienced higher
profitability levels: as the loan size grows, the lenders have to pay more attention to risk
mitigation. Nevertheless, no significant correlation was observed with solidarity groups. In
terms of the rates of non-repayment with higher interest rates, the authors find that this
observation only holds for individual-based lenders. Consequently, raising interest rates
result in an improved financial performance only for individual-based lenders and tend to be
more profitable at high rates. Nevertheless, for the group lending and village banking, the
authors did not observe a significant relation between higher interest rates versus repayment
rates and profitability. For most group lending, the opposite of individual-based lending is
true: their financial performances diminishes with higher interest rates.

4.3 Trade-off between depth of outreach to the poor and profitability
Secondly, the authors investigated the trade-off between the depth of outreach to the poor
and profitability. Their main conclusion is that achieving profitability and greater outreach to
the poor is possible. Larger loan sizes are associated with lower average coats for individual
and solidarity group lenders. Although larger loan could imply and lower outreach level to
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the poor, it represents a betterment of welfare in general. Furthermore, institutions that make
smaller loans were not found to be less profitable than other larger loan institutions.

4.4 The possibilities of a mission drift
Finally, the paper investigates the possibilities of a mission drift “a shift in the composition
of new clients, or a reorientation from poorer to wealthier clients among existing ones” 18 and
concludes that there is not enough evidence to show such a development. Nevertheless the
study shows that gender can be an issue. Individual-based lenders with lower average loan
size lend more to women. The authors also found that larger microbanks tend to give out
larger loans and to men more frequently than to women, suggesting that bigger size implies
less outreach but more profitability. Mission drift on the other hand is a minor concern for
group lender and village banks as such correlations were not observed for these methods.
Nevertheless, with larger loans by individual and group lender tend not to reach women. The
authors conclude these are insufficient to prove mission drift but do express the willingness
of the institutions as they grow, to cater to customers able to manage larger loans.

Table 4: Summary of Mission Drift Result19

18
19

Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 23
Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 42
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V. Analysis of data: the performance of several microfinance banks
5.1 Sample Statistics: commercial banks specialized in microfinance
In order to evaluate the performance of banks specialized in microfinance, I took a sample of
banks from the database BankScope. The sample is comprised of 22 banks from around the
world for which the range of Total Assets spans from USD 6 million to USD 554 million in
the last accounting year. Other available date include, the “Operating Income”, the “Net
Income”, the “Net Interest Revenue”, “Equity” and “Deposits & Short Term funding”.

With respect to ratios, the first one is “Equity/ Total Assets”. It is a measure of the capital
adequacy of a bank. It shows the role of equity within the financing structure of the bank.
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Secondly, the “Net Interest Margin” is computed by dividing “Net Interest Income” by
“Total Earning Assets”. It is an indicator of the profitability of the bank.

The third, ratio is the ROAE (Return on Average Equity) which is also a metric of
profitability. The ratio is calculated by dividing annual “Net Income” by “Average Equity”,
average amount of deployed capital.

The fourth ratio is the ROAA (Return on Average Assets), another metric of profitability. It
shows how efficient the bank was at generating earnings from its assets. It is computed by
dividing “Net Income” by “Total Assets”.

The next ratio is “Cost to Income” which is also a profitability and efficiency measure for a
bank where “Operating Expenses” are divided by “Operating Income”.

The last ratio, which expresses the liquidity of the assets of the bank, is “Liquid Assets /
Customer and Short Term Funding”.

The following two tables present a synchronic analysis of the 22 banks. In the next section, I
will present a diachronic and synchronic approach to the performance of four banks: the
Grameen Bank, the Bank of Khyber, Banco Solidario and Mibanco. For each bank, I will
first look at some of the general data over time and compare the last accounting year to the
sample of the 22 banks. I will then proceed in the same way for the analysis of the ratio: I
will first present a diachronic observation of the ratios and then compare the ratio from the
last accounting year to that of the ratios of the sample of 22 banks.
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5.2 The Grameen Bank, Bangladesh
Grameen Bank: General Data (Source: BankScope)

Operating Income
Net Income
Net Interest Revenue
Total Assets

2004
th USD
51243
6,949
31,390
554,031

2003
th USD
42072
6,082
27,881
463,950

2002
th USD
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
390,366

2001
th USD
37569
1,026
35,318
347,035

Equity
Deposits & Short term funding

126,602
417,720

140,077
321,850

99,639
290,190

36,747
306,637

The Grameen Bank has been the pioneer in microfinance since its creation in 1976. The latest
data from BankScope show that “Total Assets”, “Equity” and “Net Income” have increased
from 2001 to 2004, although there was a slight decrease for “Equity” in 2004. We can also
see that the “Operating Income” has increased throughout the four years. Furthermore, we
can see that the general trend in the “Net Interest Revenue” has been a decrease since 2001.
Finally, “Deposits & Short term funding” has generally increased over the four years.
Consequently, as the “Net Interest Revenue” has decreased, the bank must have resorted to
other sources of financing such as the increase in “Deposits & Short term funding”.

In comparing the Grameen Bank’s performance in 2004 to its peers in the sample, we can see
that it has a “Net Income” of USD 7 million, higher than the average USD 5.96 million. The
same is true for its “Interest Revenue”, USD 31 million, whereas the average is USD 27.67
million. The Grameen Bank has the highest “Total Assets” in the group, USD 554 million
and the highest “Deposits & Short term funding”, USD 418 million.

Grameen Bank: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
2004

2003

2002

2001
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Capital
Equity / Total Assets
Operations
Net Interest Margin
Return On Average Assets (ROAA)
Return On Average Equity (ROAE)
Cost To Income Ratio
Liquidity
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding

22.85

30.19

25.53

10.59

7.39
1.39
5.3
53.71

8.07
1.43
5.11
61.45

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

12.18
0.3
2.79
63.77

31.56

31.21

26.47

31.81

With respect to the ratios, the first one, “Equity / Total Assets” show us that the share of
assets financed by equity has been irregular although the general trend has been an increase
from 2001 to 2004. The “Net Interest Margin” computed by interest income over the
earnings assets, exhibits a decreasing share of the interest income in the earnings from the
assets. Indeed, as the “Net Interest Revenue” has also been decreasing since 2001, this could
suggest that the bank has to rely on other sources of income for its operations and thus had to
suffer a decrease in self-sufficiency over the past few years. On the positive side, the ROAA
and ROAE have generally increased from 2001 to 2004.

A higher ROAA suggests a more efficient use of the bank’s assets to generate income.
Nevertheless, an increase in the ROAE could signal an increase of financing through debt.
The ROAE is computed by as follows: ROAE = Net Income / Stockholders’ Equity. We
know that assets equal to the sum of stockholders’ equity and liabilities. In other words,
stockholders’ equity equals assets minus liabilities. Consequently, if the ROAE is increasing,
either “Net Income” is increasing or “Stockholders’ Equity” decreasing. If it is the later, that
would mean an increase in liabilities. From the previous table, we have seen that the “Net
Income” has increased over the four years. Nevertheless, the bank’s reliance on debt has
probably increased too as the “Net Interest Revenue” has decreased. In addition, the “Cost to
Income” ratio has decreased since 2001. Finally, “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST funding” ratio
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has been fairly stable over the four years, implying that the bank was able to maintain, if not
increase the number of loans given to customers.

Doing a synchronic comparison with the sample of banks, we can see that the bank’s “Equity
/ Total Assets” ratio is very close to the average. Nevertheless, for “Liquid Assets / Cust &
ST funding” ratio is one standard deviation above the mean, very close to the maximum of
the sample. With respect to the operations ratios, the bank is significantly lower than the
average for the ROAE and the ROAA, suggesting that the bank has room to improve its
efficiency compared to other banks. Furthermore, the “Net Interest Margin” is also lower
than the mean. We can see that the “Cost to Income Ratio” is significantly lower than the
average, more than one standard deviation away, thus showing that the bank is relatively
profitable. Lastly, the “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST funding” ratio is close to the highest of the
sample, suggesting that the bank is more able to fund projects and give out loans than its
peers.

5.3 The Bank of Khyber, Pakistan
Bank of Khyber: General Data (Source: BankScope)
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Operating Income
Net Income
Net Interest Revenue
Total Assets
Equity
Deposits & Short term funding

2004
th USD
13,683
4,381
12,381
402,853
30,812
338,516

2003
th USD
16,461
5,324
15,328
331,948
27,313
287,066

2002
th USD
11,522
2,417
-2,716
321,911
21,492
265,084

2001
th USD
7,611
3,795
-3,220
283,070
18,346
244,570

2000
th USD
6,094
-2,712
-2,359
264,626
10,951
235,375

In terms of the general data, the “Operating Income” and the “Net Income” have increased
throughout the five years for the Bank of Khyber. Although the “Net Interest Revenue” was
up to $15,328,000 in 2003 from the negatives in 2000 and 2001, the bank saw a decrease in
2004 down to $ 12,381,000. In terms of the “Total Assets”, the bank was able to increase it
significantly throughout the years. We can also see that the general trend for the “Deposits &
Short term funding” was an overall increase until 2004.

In terms of comparing the bank to the sample, we can see that it has a significantly lower
“Operating Income” and “Net Income”. This is also true for its “Net Interest Revenue” where
the average is $27,670,000. The bank has the second largest “Total Assets” and is fairly close
to the average in the amount of “Equity”. Finally, its “Deposits & Short term funding”,
$339,000,000, is significantly above the average $223,708,400.

Bank of Khyber: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
Capital
Equity / Total Assets

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

7.65

8.23

6.68

6.48

4.14
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Operations
Net Interest Margin
Return on Average Assets (ROAA)
Return on Average Equity (ROAE)
Cost to Income Ratio
Liquidity
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding

3.84
1.21
15.31
36.04

5.27
1.61
21.6
35.61

-1.02
0.79
11.92
37.37

-1.36
1.42
26.37
51.25

-1.09
-1.1
-23.42
58.88

32.8

18.81

55.16

51.38

55.55

In terms of the ratios, the general trend is an increase in “Equity / Total Assets”, although
there was a slight decrease for 2004, which shows that equity has played a larger role in the
financing structure of the bank over time. With respect to the operations ratios, the “Net
Interest Margin” has been negative from 2000 to 2002, but was at 5.27 for 2003 and stayed
positive for the following year, although it decreased. The overall tendency for the ROAA
was an increase however the ROAE has been very irregular. The changes in the ROAE
suggest that the financing means of the bank are unstable, whether through debt or equity.
However, a more positive point is the decrease of the “Cost to Income Ratio” since 2000.
Finally, we can see that the liquidity of the bank has decreased over the years, which would
imply that the bank is able to accommodate fewer loans.

When we compare the performance of the bank with its peers in the sample, we can see that
the bank is more than one standard deviation below the average for “Equity / Total Assets”.
This is also the case for the “Net Interest Margin” which actually is the lowest of the sample.
These two observations suggest that the bank might be resorting exterior sources of funding
rather than equity or interest revenue. Whereas the ROAE is very close to the average, a
positive point for the bank, the ROAA is much lower than the mean. In terms of the “Cost to
Income Ratio” the bank is the best performer: it has the lowest value in the sample (36.04)
and with the “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding” (32.8), the bank has a value very close to
the maximum (32.9).
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5.4 Banco Solidario, Ecuador
Banco Solidario: General Data (Source: BankScope)

Operating Income
Net Income
Net Interest Revenue
Total Assets
Equity
Deposits & Short term funding

2005
th USD
46,900
3,200
9,500
297,600
23,800
218,400

2004
th USD
34,000
3,600
9,300
256,600
20,700
190,900

2003
th USD
26,600
3,400
7,700
181,600
17,400
136,900

2002
th USD
20,400
3,000
7,800
158,200
13,000
127,600

2001
th USD
10,400
1,200
3,100
113,400
11,000
96,900

Banco Solidario exhibits a stable financial situation throughout the five years. In most cases
the numbers have doubled from 2001 to 2005, which is the case for the “Equity” and
“Deposits & Short term funding”, if not approximately tripled, such as “Operating Income”,
“Net Income”, “Net Interest Revenue” and “Total Assets”.

Comparing this outlook with the sample, we can see that has an “Operating Income” higher
than the average, but a “Net Income” lower than the mean. Furthermore, its “Interest
Revenue” is also significantly lower, more than one standard deviation away. Although the
bank ranks third in terms of “Total Assets”, it is also significantly lower than the average in
“Equity”, more than one standard deviation.

Banco Solidario: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
Capital
Equity / Total Assets
Operations
Net Interest Margin
Return on Average Assets (ROAA)
Return on Average Equity (ROAE)

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

8

8.07

9.58

8.22

9.7

3.87
1.16
14.38

4.83
1.64
18.9

5.18
2
22.37

6.62
2.21
25

3.95
1.3
11.71
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Cost to Income Ratio
Liquidity
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding

78.68

87.06

84.96

81.37

95.19

17.9

15.77

12.56

7.45

14.65

When we look at the performance of Banco Solidario with respect to ratios, we can notice
that the “Equity/ Total Assets” ratio has been quite stable over the course of five years,
although there was a slight decrease. However, the “Net Interest Margin”, 3.87, has
decreased to a level lower than its 2001 performance of 3.95, after having showed some
improvements. The “Cost to Income Ratio” has decreased over time. We can also see that
the ROAA has not increased, which would suggest that the bank was not able to increase its
efficiency in terms of its assets.

However, we see that the ROAE has increased, implying that the bank might have resorted to
financing with debt, through an increase in liabilities (Recall the denominator of the ROAE,
Stockholders’ Equity = Assets – Liabilities), or that the assets might have increased
significantly. From the previous table, we had observed that the assets of the bank had almost
tripled. Nevertheless, the ROAA has decreased. Consequently, Banco Solidario is a bank that
is abundant in capital, but that was not able to make use of it efficiently. With respect to the
liquidity of the bank, we can see that it has increased over the years, suggesting that Banco
Solidario’s capability to give out loans has increased.

In comparison to its peers, the bank is significantly below the average in “Equity / Total
Assets” and in the “Net Interest Margin”. However, Banco Solidario is in the range of the
mean in terms of its other operations ratios such as the ROAE, the ROAA and the “Cost to
Income Ratio”. Finally, we can see that the “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding” ratio is also
close to the average of the sample.
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5.5 Mibanco, Peru
Mibanco: General Data (Source: BankScope)

Operating Income
Net Income
Net Interest Revenue
Total Assets
Equity
Deposits & Short term funding

2005
th USD
54572
13,009
53,989
254,455
42,847
197,637

2004
th USD
43855
7,807
43,672
162,763
37,176
106,648

2003
th USD
40899
7,248
40,889
138,984
31,909
83,252

2002
th USD
29852
5,435
30,478
108,281
23,847
70,546

2001
th USD
19486
3,165
19,515
73,820
18,237
50,937

The last bank, Mibanco, exhibits an increasing trend in all of the variables. We can see that
some have almost doubled, such as the “Operating Income”, the “Net interest Revenue” and
the “Equity”. Furthermore, some variables have tripled, or quadrupled such as the “Net
Income”, the “Total Assets” and the “Deposits & Short Term funding”.

When comparing Mibanco to the sample, we can see that it is the fourth largest bank with
respect to “Total Assets” but has a significantly higher “Operating Income” than the average.
It also has the highest “Net Income” in the sample, with also the highest “Net Interest
Revenue”. These would suggest that the bank is highly self-sufficient and profitable, with a
high degree of success in its loans. Furthermore, it has“Equity” and “Deposits & Short Term
funding” levels close to the average.

Mibanco: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
Capital
Equity / Total Assets
Operations
Net Interest Margin
Return on Average Assets (ROAA)
Return on Average Equity (ROAE)

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

16.84

22.84

22.96

22.02

24.71

29.46
6.34
33.19

31.61
5.04
22.03

36.92
5.82
25.84

37.95
6.02
26.06

37.04
5.25
18.79
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Cost to Income Ratio
Liquidity
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding

57.94

60.92

60.31

64.92

66.17

12.06

17.07

10.82

11.34

6.61

The “Equity / Total Assets” ratio suggests that the share of equity in assets has decreased
over the course of the five years and so has the “Net Interest Margin”. These would suggest
that the bank’s revenue from other sources of income have increased in these years. We can
see that the ROAA has been fairly stable since 2001 whereas the ROAE has increased
significantly, probably due to the increase in “Total Assets” (see previous table) or an
increase in liabilities. Although the “Cost to Income Ratio” has decreased slightly, it has been
fairly constant. Finally, a positive point for the bank is the increase in its liquidity level.

Comparing Mibanco to the sample, we can see that the “Equity / Total Assets” is lower that
situation is similar for the liquidity level of the bank. Nevertheless, Mibanco appears has a
well-run bank as it has significantly higher ratios than the average in operations such as the
“Net Interest Margin”, the ROAE, the ROAA and the “Cost to Income Ratio”. All of these
suggest that the bank is making an efficient use of its resources.

5.6 Conclusions on the analysis
Consequently, we can say that the four banks with the highest total assets are exhibiting a
positive outlook in terms of the growth of their revenue and their assets. Their deposits have
also increased continually throughout the years suggesting that they were able to serve an
increasing number of customers. Furthermore, they were able to make a more efficient use of
their assets and equity, expressed through the increase in the ROAA and the ROAE.
Nevertheless, they are still struggling to maintain consistency: even the Grameen Bank which
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is the most experienced in microbanking, has seen its “Net Interest Margin” fall in the last
years, suggesting a fall in the interest revenue. The Bank of Khyber had three years of
negative “Net Interest Revenue” before 2003. In this respect, stability is a key factor that
microfinance banks need to strive for in order to generate a regular source of funding and to
maintain self-sufficiency, the overarching goal of the microfinance sector in general.

VI. Conclusions: the future of microfinance

During its relatively short history, micro credit has evolved into microfinance, reflecting the
drastic change in the approach to the alleviation of poverty around the world. The industry
has started through the volunteering of idealist NGOs and has now come to embody a
morally acceptable sub-industry for the formal financial market: “Microfinance presents
itself as a new market-based strategy for poverty reduction”20. Microfinance is now seen as a
“win-win” situation for both partakers: the lender of the capital and the small borrower. In
this approach, the role the subsidies should be play would ideally be limited to the initiation
of a microfinance project and then the organization would reach a self-sustaining, if not
profit making entity through the savings of the clients, the bonds that are being issued and the
funds from commercial sources.

According to Jean-Philippe de Schrevel, founder of BlueOrchard Finance, the future of
microfinance lies in the formal financial market that will make the industry self-sustainable.
The goal of microfinance in the future is to become a transparent and regulated industry. In
this respect, the most important development to be achieved is the linkage of microfinance to
20

Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch, page 16
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the commercial capital market in order to satisfy the growing needs of the clients of this
industry.

Furthermore he suggests that the role of international investments in microfinance remains
crucial in the achievement of these goals. International funding can widen the opportunities
presented by a local capital market and can isolate MFIs from economic uncertainties
observed in developing countries. Secondly, this international capital has the potential to
attract more international businesses in the industry and allow the offering of more diverse
services to the poor. Consequently, international investments are expected to have a positive
impact by bringing dynamism to the commercial financing of MFIs.

BlueOrchard, as a microfinance investment consultancy, portrays this new approach to
microfinance by managing debt funds and attracting commercial investors to the
microfinance industry. BlueOrchard Finance manages and advises investments worth USD
135 million through partnerships with other financial institutions. BlueOrchard also
developed the first fully commercial microfinance fund, Dexia Micro-Credit, and continues
to create other funds, including local microfinance funds.

Consequently, microfinance can be a commercial business in addition to its non-profit
aspect; but it is a different one, not to be approached like consumer finances. The
participation of commercial banks in microfinance requires that they first and foremost have
an extensive network of branches, an understanding of local cultures, make use of economies
of scale and train their credit agents for a successful monitoring of a loan.
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Nevertheless, the direct involvement of a commercial bank in microfinance without
experience can be costly. In this respect, a partnership with a microfinance institution or an
indirect participation might be preferable. In any case, in the near future, we can expect
more commercial banks to be involved in microfinance. This participation is most likely
going to be in an indirect fashion such as securitization through microfinance bonds and
funds. Indeed, this suggests that the microfinance industry is in the right direction, creating
ties with the formal financial system in order to achieve the necessary scale to make the
required changes for the financially deprived population of the world.
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